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ABSTRACT 
We examine how firms’ dividend policy affects the initial compensation of their newly 
appointed CEOs. We focus on newly appointed CEOs to isolate the effect of dividends on 
compensation and to provide new insights into an aspect largely neglected by compensation 
research. We show that the dividend payout is positively related to new CEO compensation. 
Further, the positive effect of dividends is stronger for firms with no dividend cuts over the 
past two, three and four years, firms with relatively high institutional ownership, and those with 
strong boards, consistent with new CEOs receiving higher pay as compensation for greater 
dividend pressure. 
JEL classification: G30, G35, J33  
Keywords: CEO compensation; New CEOs; Dividend policy; Corporate governance 
 
 
                                                          
† Corresponding author. Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Aberconway Building, Colum Drive, 
Cardiff, CF10 3EU; E-mail address: ChenJ56@cardiff.ac.uk. 
We are grateful for helpful comments from seminar participants at Aston Business School, IÉSEG School of 
Management, and Essex Business School. All errors are our own. 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
Among the recurring and contentious themes in the literature on compensation are the nature 
and form of the pay-setting process1 and the determinants of pay,2 in addition to the effects of 
CEO pay on firm behavior and performance.3 While a substantial body of the extant literature 
focuses on the compensation of the incumbent CEO, little attention has been devoted to the 
initial compensation of the new CEO.4 Notable exceptions are Harris and Helfat (1997), Chen 
(2015) and Chang et al. (2016). The former study documents that externally hired CEOs receive 
greater initial compensation than those promoted internally. The authors attribute the 
differences in pay to CEOs’ differential human capital.5 The latter two studies find that new 
CEOs at financially distressed firms receive higher pay, which includes a compensation 
premium for additional risk bearing. Our aim is to extend this line of inquiry by investigating 
whether the initial compensation of the newly appointed CEO is affected by the hiring firm’s 
dividend payout ― a decision made by the prior management but with lasting effects on the 
new CEO.  
High dividends can be regarded as a mechanism to itigate Jensen’s (1986) free cash 
flow problem by subjecting the managers to the performance pressure that expected, continuing 
dividend payments entail. As high dividends reduce retained profits, the firm subjects itself to 
intense monitoring by the capital markets, as it needs to raise new capital more often (Rozeff, 
1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). While dividend payments to shareholders are not 
                                                          
1 See e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen and Murphy (1990); Yermack (1997); Bebchuk et al. (2002); 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004); and Bebchuk et al. (2010). 
2 See e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick (1999); Hartzell and Starks (2003); Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009); 
Graham et al. (2012); Custódio et al. (2013); Chemmanur et al. (2013); Peters and Wagner (2014); and Focke et 
al. (2017). 
3 See e.g. Bizjak et al. (1993); Core et al. (1999); Coles et al. (2006); Yermack (2006); Armstrong and Vashishtha 
(2012); Hayes et al. (2012); Armstrong et al. (2013); and Anantharaman and Lee (2014). 
4 The ‘new CEO’ in this paper refers to the newly appointed (or incoming) CEO, in the case of CEO turnover, to 
replace the incumbent (departing) CEO. 
5 When executives switch firms, they forego the future value of their firm-specific skills in their old firm, and take 
on additional risk associated with their lack of firm-specific skills in relation to their new firm. To compensate for 
the disutility due to the switch, the firm has to pay a premium to an external successor (Harris and Helfat, 1997). 
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mandatory, the survey evidence in Brav et al. (2005) – which updates the seminal Lintner 
(1956) study – reveals that managers have a strong desire to maintain the current dividend level 
and are extremely reluctant to cut dividends. Specifically, managers prefer to forego profitable 
investment projects or to raise external funds than reducing the dividend payout. This extreme 
reluctance can be attributed to the large penalties incurred for reducing dividends as dividend 
cuts and omissions are followed by significant, negative price reactions (Healy and Palepu, 
1988; Michaely et al., 1995; Benartzi et al., 1997; Jensen et al., 2010), large declines in 
institutional ownership (Parrino et al., 2003), an increased likelihood of CEO dismissal (Parrino 
et al., 2003; Schaeck et al., 2012), and fewer future external board seats for top executives 
(Kaplan and Reishus, 1990). Hence, to the extent that the pressure to maintain high levels of 
dividends increases the demands on CEOs, new CEOs at high-dividend firms should receive 
higher pay as compensation for the greater disutility associated with increased performance 
demands, in the spirit of Hermalin (2005). 
A potential concern arising when attempting to identify the effect of the dividend 
payout on CEO compensation is that dividend policy may be endogenously determined. For 
example, prior research suggests that entrenched managers may voluntarily commit to a higher 
dividend payout as a protection against disciplinary actions by external shareholders (Fluck, 
1999; Hu and Kumar, 2004). They also have substantial influence over their own compensation 
package (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). This concern, however, is difficult 
to address in a specification that examines incumbent CEO compensation because of the 
difficulty in teasing out the effect of the dividend payout from other aspects, such as managerial 
entrenchment, that could alter CEO pay. The primary attraction of focusing on the initial 
compensation of newly appointed CEOs is that it helps address this concern. Newly appointed 
CEOs have had little or no time to gain control over corporate decisions. Indeed, the initial pay 
packages of the new CEOs are likely determined before they take office (Chang et al., 2016), 
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i.e. at a time when the CEOs are as yet not entrenched. More importantly, the hiring firm’s 
dividend payout essentially represents a succession context whereby the ‘baton’ is passed by 
the CEO’s predecessor, along with the pressure that goes with it. Therefore, by comparing new 
CEOs’ compensation across firms with different levels of dividend payouts, our study is able 
to better isolate the effect of inherited dividend pressure on compensation. 
To set the stage, we first examine the relation between the dividend payout and the new 
CEO’s compensation. As ameasure of CEO pay, we use both market values and risk-adjusted 
values of compensation. Risk-adjusted values measure cash equivalents that CEOs are willing 
to accept in place of (riskier) pay packages that contain equity-based pay (Peters and Wagner, 
2014). These values take into account that equity (as part and parcel of the pay package) is 
worth less to an undiversified, risk-averse CEO than to an optimally diversified investor. By 
using risk-adjusted compensation, we directly adjust CEO pay for differences in pay structure, 
thereby mitigating the concern that a pay premium compensating for the riskiness of equity-
based pay drives our findings. Nevertheless, the two compensation measures yield qualitatively 
similar estimates, suggesting that differences in compensation risk cannot explain our findings. 
We provide evidence of a positive relation between the dividend payout and new CEO 
compensation based on firm fixed effects regressions including a wide range of controls and 
year fixed effects. Specifically, the coefficient estimate for our main variable of interest in the 
baseline model suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in the dividend-to-assets ratio 
is associated with 12.0% higher new CEO compensation, or an increase of $509,614 ($32 ,057) 
per year for the CEO in market value (risk-adjusted value). This finding is robust to alternative 
measures of dividend payouts, subsamples, and econometric specifications. In addition, we 
examine whether a positive relation also exists between new CEO compensation and stock 
repurchases, which is a more flexible method of disgorging cash to shareholders compared to 
dividends and which imposes no commitment on CEOs to make future payouts. As expected, 
 
5 
 
we find that firms with greater repurchases do not pay their CEO more, consistent with the 
compensation for dividend pressure view. Further, the results based on propensity score 
matching reinforce the baseline findings. Dividend-paying firms on average pay their new 
CEOs significantly more than their matched non-dividend-paying counterparts. 
Next, to provide further evidence that the positive effect of dividends on CEO pay 
compensates for the performance pressure that continuing, high dividend payments entail, we 
explore the variation in the level of such pressure. If maintaining high levels of dividends 
enhances the demands on the new CEO and thus increases the pay they require, we expect the 
positive effect to be more pronounced when dividend pressure is great. Hence, we identify 
three settings, which increase the pressure on the firm to maintain a high dividend payout, 
thereby exerting greater pressure on the CEO.  
First, firms have incentives to build a reputation for delivering regular dividends (and 
for not reducing dividends opportunistically) to be able to sell future equity at higher prices (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer, 2000; Gomes, 2000; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007). Ceteris 
paribus, firms with a good dividend history (i.e. no dividend cuts over the past years) have 
stronger incentives to protect their established reputation by maintaining dividend payouts. 
Thus, we expect to observe a larger effect for firms with a good dividend history where the 
pressure to maintain the high dividend payout is greater. Consistent with this prediction, we 
find that the effect of dividends on new CEO compensation is positive and statistically 
significant for firms with no dividend cuts over the past two, three, and four years, but 
insignificant for firms with at least one cut during the same periods. 
Second, prior studies suggest that institutional investors are effective monitors of 
managerial behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) and that greater institutional ownership is 
associated with improved sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm performance (Denis et 
al., 1997), higher pay-for-performance sensitivity and lower levels of fixed compensation 
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(Hartzell and Starks, 2003), as well as improved monitoring and better firm performance 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990). In a similar vein, Crane et al. (2016) provide evidence that 
institutional investors pressure firms to pay more dividends to mitigate agency problems. Thus, 
we expect the impact of dividends on new CEO compensation to be more prominent for firms 
with high institutional ownership where dividend pressure is greater. Our results are consistent 
with this conjecture. 
Finally, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that dividends are an outcome of an effective 
system that disgorges cash from firms to shareholders, especially when reinvestment 
opportunities are poor. They find empirical support for their argument. Similarly, DeAngelo et 
al. (2009) suggest that managers are pressured to maintain high dividend payouts through 
monitoring by the board. For this pressure to be taken into account in the compensation design, 
the board must be in a position to pressure the CEO to maintain and/or increase the dividend 
payout. In other words, we hypothesize that compensating for dividend-related performance 
pressure requires strong internal governance. Consistent with this view, we find that the 
positive effect of dividends on compensation only applies to firms with more independent 
boards and those with boards composed of fewer busy directors. Hence, strong boards exert 
greater pressure on the CEO to maintain high dividends and they take this pressure information 
into account when setting the new CEO’s pay. 
Our study adds to the literature on dividend policy and corporate governance more 
broadly. Since Lintner (1956), it has been well known that managers are reluctant to cut 
dividends. Brav et al. (2005) report survey evidence that confirms this observation. Further 
evidence by Michaely et al. (1995), Grullon et al. (2002), and many others, suggests that 
management’s reluctance to cut dividends is partly driven by investors’ negative reaction to 
such announcements. Given these stylized facts, high dividend payouts are likely to serve a 
disciplinary role by exerting pressure on managers to maintain firm performance, as predicted 
 
7 
 
by Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984). Our paper is the first to document how the 
disciplinary role of dividends affects (new) CEO compensation. We show that, ceteris paribus, 
a higher inherited dividend payout is associated with higher initial compensation for the new 
CEO. Similar to Hermalin (2005), we argue that CEOs demand higher pay to compensate for 
the disutility or pressure associated with increased board scrutiny. We hypothesize that firms 
with higher dividends pay their new CEO more to compensate for the enhanced disciplinary 
pressure. We find that the positive effect of dividends on new CEO pay is only observed for 
well-governed firms where the pressure to maintain a high dividend payout is greater.  
Our study also contributes to the growing literature exploring the relation between CEO 
compensation and various firm characteristics. CEOs at firms with greater institutional 
ownership are paid less, suggesting that institutional investors assume a monitoring role in 
mitigating agency problems (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Deng and Gao (2013) show that firms 
in polluted, high crime areas, or otherwise unpleasant locations pay higher compensation to 
their CEOs than firms in more livable locations. Further, Chemmanur et al. (2013) find that 
firm leverage has a positive effect on the level of CEO compensation. Focke et al. (2017) 
provide empirical evidence that CEOs of prestigious firms (firms included in Fortune’s ranking 
of America’s most admired companies) earn less. More closely related to our work, Chen (2015) 
and Chang et al. (2016) document that new CEOs at financially distressed firms receive a 
compensation premium for additional risk bearing, resulting in higher total pay. Our study 
makes a major contribution to this literature by showing that the dividend payout is another 
important firm characteristic determining the compensation contract of new CEOs.  
Our paper is also related to the ongoing debate on whether the executive compensation 
contracts we observe in practice are a result of optimal contracting or managerial rent extraction, 
as suggested by, e.g., Yermack (2009) and Bebchuk et al. (2010). Our results suggest that the 
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dividend-induced compensation premium matters in well-governed firms, an observation that 
provides support for efficient contracting theories for this subset of firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the data sources and 
model specification, and presents summary statistics. Section 3 contains our analysis of the 
effect of the dividend payout on new CEO compensation. Section 4 reports the results from 
various robustness checks. Section 5 summarizes our main findings and concludes. 
 
2. Data sources, methodology and summary statistics 
2.1. Data sources and sample selection 
Our sample is obtained from several sources. Data on CEO characteristics (e.g., age, 
tenure, and gender) and their compensation are from ExecuComp. For each year, we manually 
match the CEOs in ExecuComp with the profiles in the BoardEx database to extract additional 
data on CEO careers and education. Data on dividends and other firm characteristics is from 
Compustat. Data on institutional equity holdings is from the CDA Spectrum database. We 
obtain director characteristics from IRRC/Riskmetrics and stock returns from CRSP.  
As previously discussed, we focus on newly appointed CEOs and their initial 
compensation packages to help isolate the effect of the dividend payout on compensation. We 
define CEO turnover as a firm-year t when the ExecuComp database lists a different CEO than 
in year t-1. We end up with 2,135 new-CEO observations for 1,373 unique firms between 1996 
and 2014 for which the required data on dividend payouts and the control variables is available. 
Of the 1,373 firms in our sample, 59.4% (815) had only one CEO change and 40.6% (558) had 
two or more CEO changes. 
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2.2. Empirical specification 
To examine how the firm’s dividend policy, as measured by the dividend payout, affects 
the initial compensation of its newly appointed CEO, we examine the following baseline 
empirical specification:6 
Ln (Compensation) i, t =  +  Dividend payout i, t +  Z i, t + λ i + λ t +  i, t    (1) 
where Dividend payout is a measure of the dividend payout, including the ratio of dividends 
over net income and dividends over total assets. The findings are robust to alternative measures, 
i.e. dividends over sales, dividends per share, and the dividend yield (i.e. the ratio of dividends 
per share to the fiscal year-end stock price). Z is a vector of control variables that have been 
shown to affect CEO compensation by the extant literature. Ln (Compensation) is the logarithm 
of total compensation received during the newly appointed CEO’s first year. We use two 
measures of CEO compensation, namely, market values of compensation and risk-adjusted 
values of compensation. They, along with the control variables, are specified in Sections 
2.2.1−2.2.2. Further, λ i captures firm fixed effects. This fixed-effects specification makes use 
only of within-firm variation. That is, we estimate the effect of dividends on CEO 
compensation using only variation in the dividend payout within firms and between CEO 
change years.7 The fixed-effects approach allows us to eliminate the impact of any time-
invariant firm characteristics on compensation, although only firms with at least two CEO 
changes are used in the estimation. We also include year fixed effects, denoted as λ t, to account 
                                                          
6 An alternative specification focuses on changes instead of levels. The results suggest that dividend increases are 
associated with increases in the compensation of new CEOs, albeit less significantly so. 
7
 Alternatively, we could include CEO fixed effects and control for unobserved time-invariant CEO heterogeneity. 
Since this specification makes use only of within-CEO variation, only CEOs that switch at least twice between 
firms in our sample during the period of study are used to identify the effect of interest and there are only 38 such 
CEOs (out of 2,095 unique CEOs in the sample). Given the small number of utilizable cases, it is not surprising 
that the effect of dividend policy on new CEO compensation is no longer si nificant when using CEO fixed effects. 
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for any trends in compensation practices across firms.8 We cluster standard errors at the firm 
level to account for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. 
 
2.2.1 Dependent variables 
Our dependent variable is the new CEO’s total compensation, which is defined as the 
sum of the salary, bonus, long-term incentive plans, restricted stocks, option grants and all 
other compensation received during the CEO’s first year.9 We extract total compensation from 
ExecuComp (item tdc1) and convert it into year 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index 
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. A major imperfection of this compensation 
measure, based on market values, is that compensation structure varies considerably across 
firms and that market values of compensation include a compensating differential for the 
riskiness of stock and option grants, making it difficult to tease out the effect of the dividend 
payout. Hence, greater market values of compensation in firms with higher dividend payouts 
may not only reflect differences in payout levels, but also differences in the fraction of equity-
based pay. 
To address this concern, we compute risk-adjusted values of compensation, which 
convert market values into lower cash equivalents that CEOs would be willing to receive in 
place of pay packages that contain risky equity-based pay. By using risk-adjusted compensation, 
we explicitly take into account the fact that the equity from equity-based pay is worth less to a 
risk-averse, under-diversified CEO than to a well-diversified investor. This approach allows us 
to adjust the level of compensation for differences in compensation structure, thereby 
mitigating the concern that the observed effect of the dividend payout on compensation is 
driven by the pay-structure related risk premium. 
                                                          
8 The results are robust to accounting for industry-year fixed effects, such as industry-specific changes in labor 
market conditions. 
9 We identify the CEO’s starting date using both the becameceo item in ExecuComp and the proxy statements. 
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Specifically, to compute risk-adjusted values of compensation we use the Ingersoll 
(2006) model.10 The implementation of the model strictly follows that described in Peters and 
Wagner (2014). The two unobservable model parameters that require attention are the 
manager’s degree of relative risk aversion, ρ, and the portfolio constraint, θ.11 Following Peters 
and Wagner (2014), we use ρ = 3 and θ = 50% for our main analysis. Our robustness analysis 
in Section 4 shows that the results hold for alternative values for the two parameters.  
 
2.2.2 Control variables 
We control for a number of firm- and CEO-specific determinants of CEO compensation 
identified by the literature. It is crucial to control for firm size and performance in compensation 
regressions (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999), but even more so in our setting because 
larger firms and more profitable firms tend to pay higher dividends. We measure firm size as 
the natural logarithm of sales. We proxy for firm performance using both market (Stock return) 
and operating measures (ROA). Next, we include Firm age, the number of years since the firm’s 
CRSP listing date, to control for the stage in the firm’s lifecycle, which may have implications 
for both compensation and dividend policies. We also include Tobin’s Q as a measure of the 
firm’s growth opportunities to account for the potential matching between higher-quality 
managers and firms with greater growth opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992). Moreover, 
Chemmanur et al. (2013) find that firms with higher leverage pay their CEOs more. We define 
Leverage as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Following Ittner et al. (2003), we include 
                                                          
10 As argued by Peters and Wagner (2015), the Ingersoll (2006) model has two major advantages. First, it provides 
a valuation framework that allows the CEO to optimally respond to risk exposure. For example, the model allows 
the CEO to reduce his risk exposure by exercising options early or by allocating less outside wealth to the market 
portfolio. In contrast, the Hall and Murphy (2002) model does not incorporate these features. Second, the Ingersoll 
(2006) model provides closed-form solutions for most expressions and does not require numerical computations 
of integrals. This makes the model more appealing than that of Cai and Vijh (2005). The Stata program provided 
by Peters and Wagner (2015) to implement this model is available at:  
http://www.uva.nl/en/profile/p/e/f.s.peters/f.s.peters.html. 
11 The portfolio constraint is defined as the fraction of wealth that the manager is forced to hold in his firm’s stock 
beyond that which he would voluntarily hold. This parameter is determined primarily by the CEO’s unvested 
holdings of company stock and options. 
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Cash, the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets, as a measure of cash 
constraints that may affect compensation levels. To mitigate the effects of outliers, we 
winsorize all accounting variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
We incorporate four controls for board structure and institutional presence because of 
prior evidence that they are important determinants of CEO compensation and/or the dividend 
payout (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 
2009; Chen et al., 2017). Board busyness is the fraction of busy directors on the board, with 
busy directors being those who hold three or more directorships, following Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006). Fraction female directors is the fraction of female directors on the board, and Board 
independence is the fraction of independent directors. Institutional ownership is the proportion 
of equity owned by 13-F institutional investors.  
Graham et al. (2012) show that managerial attributes explain most of the variation in 
CEO compensation. Hence, we include the following CEO characteristics to account for 
manager-specific heterogeneities in compensation. First, we use the following two 
demographic traits: CEO age is the age of the CEO in years, and Female CEO is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the CEO is a woman, and zero otherwise. Second, we use the 
following three proxies for the CEO’s talent as suggested in the literature (e.g. Graham et al., 
2012; Custódio et al., 2013): MBA, an indicator variable for CEOs who have a MBA degree; 
Ivy League, an indicator variable for CEOs who attended an Ivy League school at any academi  
level; and Fast track, the age at which the xecutive became a CEO for the first time. External 
hire is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO was hired from outside the firm, and 
zero otherwise. Following Weisbach (1988) and Peters and Wagner (2014), we classify a CEO 
as an outside hire if he joined the firm no earlier than one year before his appointment as CEO.12 
                                                          
12 To identify externally hired CEOs, we first use ExecuComp items joined_co (the date when the executive joined 
the company) and becameceo (the date when the executive became CEO of the firm) and then supplement these 
items using hand-collected data from the proxy statements. 
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Fourth, Schoar and Zuo (2017) document that CEOs who started their careers during recessions 
tend to have different career trajectories than those who started in economically prosperous 
periods: They become CEOs more quickly, but ultimately end up heading smaller firms and 
receiving lower compensation. Therefore, following Schoar and Zuo (2017) we include an 
indicator variable, Recession CEO, set to one if there was a recession13 during the year when 
the CEO reached the age of 24, and zero otherwise.14 Finally, Military CEO is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one if the CEO has any military experience, and zero otherwise. 
Benmelech and Frydman (2015) show that military experience is important to the formation of 
managers as CEOs with such experience are associated with more conservative financial 
policies. To construct these variables, we manually match (by company name and CEO name) 
the executives in ExecuComp who are identified as CEOs in a specific year with the detailed 
profiles in the BoardEx database. This enables us to obtain detailed data on CEO characteristics, 
including demographics, educational background, career path (i.e. the firms where the CEO 
worked in the past as well as the positions assumed in these firms), and military service. 
 
2.2.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our main variables. Panel A focuses on the CEO 
compensation characteristics. The mean (median) total compensation of newly appointed 
CEOs in our sample is $4,246,785 ($2,717,141). The mean and median risk-adjusted 
compensation is $3,178,830 and $2,004,248, respectively. The lower risk-adjusted values 
compared to the market values reflect the discount for the riskiness of equity-based pay. Panel 
B presents the descriptive statistics for the firm characteristics. On average, a firm in our sample 
                                                          
13 Recession years are identified using the business cycle dating database of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER). To be classified as a recession year, the (calendar) year must either include the trough of a 
business cycle or fully fall within a recession period. 
14
 Following Schoar and Zuo (2017), we proxy for the exogenous starting date by using the manager’s birth year 
plus 24. This approach allows us to avoid the endogenous selection of when a manager chose to enter the labor 
market.  
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has a dividend payout ratio of 26.8%, dividends-to-assets ratio of 1.4%, sales of $6,069 million, 
a Tobin’s Q of 1.9, leverage of 22.2%, a return on assets of 8.8%, a stock return of 15.4%, a
cash-to-assets ratio of 13.5%, and anage of 27 years. Panel C reports descriptive statistics on 
the governance characteristics. The average board is composed of 30.7% of busy directors. The 
average percentage of independent directors is 72.5%, and that of female directors is 11.1%. 
The average institutional ownership is 70.6%. These descriptive statistics are similar to those 
reported by previous studies on CEO compensation (e.g., Custódio et al., 2013; Peters and 
Wagner, 2014; Chang et al., 2016). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Regarding the other CEO characteristics reported in Panel D, 3.6% of the newly 
appointed CEOs in our sample are female, and 27.5% of the CEOs are hired from outside the 
firm. The average CEO age is 53 years and the average age at which a CEO becomes CEO for 
the first time is about 49 years. Additionally, the CEO holds an MBA degree for 36.6% of all 
observations. The CEO has military experience for 5.3% of the firm-years and has attended an 
Ivy League university for 15.4% of the firm-years. Finally, 22.4% of the CEOs experienced a 
recession when they were aged 24. These CEO characteristics have values in line with those 
reported by Custódio et al. (2013) and Schoar and Zuo (2017). 
Table 2 compares the means of various firm, governance, and CEO characteristics 
across firm-years with dividends and those without. Consistent with our prediction, the average 
market value (risk-adjusted value) of new CEO compensation for firms with dividends is 
$4,653,666 ($3,655,521), which is 29.4% (51.7%) higher than the average value of $3,596,865 
($2,409,305) for firms with no dividend payments. The results are qualitatively similar when 
we conduct a parallel univariate analysis for the entire ExecuComp-Compustat merged 
universe that includes both new and incumbent CEOs. We find that the average market value 
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(risk-adjusted value) of CEO compensation for firms with dividends is $4,670,199 
($3,867,025), which is 21.3% (65.2%) higher than the equivalent average of $3,851,580 
($2,340,984) for firms with no dividends.15 
Insert Table 2 about here 
With respect to the firm and governance characteristics, firms that pay dividends are 
larger, more mature, have a lower Tobin’s q, higher leverage, have better performance in terms 
of ROA, smaller cash holdings, a higher fraction of busy directors, a higher fraction of 
independent directors, a higher fraction of female directors, and higher institutional ownership. 
In terms of the CEO characteristics, new CEOs at dividend-paying firms are older and became 
CEO for the first time at a later age. Additionally, they are more likely to be hired from inside 
the firm, to have military experience, to hold an MBA degree than those at non-dividend-
paying firms. These patterns suggest that the dividend policy may be related to firm, 
governance, and CEO characteristics, highlighting the importance of controlling for these 
characteristics in our analysis, which we do. 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Baseline regressions 
Panel A of Table 3 presents our main test on whether firms with higher dividends pay 
their new CEOs more than those with lower dividends. In columns (1) and (2), we estimate the 
baseline specification in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of new CEO compensation. The main variable of interest is the firm’s dividend payout, 
as measured by both dividends over net income (Dividend payout) and dividends over total 
                                                          
15 While this observation confirms the tabulated results, the inclusion of incumbent CEOs, as aforementioned, 
could fuel the endogeneity problem and thus introduce additional bias into the estimation of the dividend-
compensation relation. Therefore, we focus on new CEOs for further regression analysis. 
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assets (Dividend/TA). The results show that total compensation received by the new CEO is 
positively associated with the firm’s dividend payout, consistent with the notion that new CEOs 
at high-dividend firms receive higher pay, compensating for greater dividend pressure. The 
coefficient on the dividend variable is statistically significant at the 5% level in both 
specifications. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient on Dividend/TA in column (2) 
indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in the dividend-to-assets ratio is associated 
with 12.0% higher new CEO compensation (. × . − = . ), ceteris paribus. This 
magnitude is economically significant: 12.0% of the mean (median) market value of new CEO 
compensation is $509,614 ($326,057).  
Insert Table 3 about here 
It is likely that, at least in part, the results discussed above are driven by compensation 
for the riskiness of equity-based pay. To alleviate this concern, we use the natural logarithm of 
risk-adjusted compensation as the dependent variable. This risk-adjusted measure adjusts the 
value of compensation for differences in pay structure. The results are shown in columns (3) 
and (4). The coefficients on the dividend variables are somewhat smaller in magnitude (as one 
would expect) but remain significantly positive, confirming that differences in the riskiness of 
pay packages do not drive our results. 
As expected, firm size measured by the natural logarithm of sales is significantly and 
positively related to CEO compensation. The coefficient on External hire is also significantly 
positive, similar to the findings in Fee and Hadlock (2003) and Custódio et al. (2013). 
Interestingly, after controlling for other factors, there is a positive association between Female 
CEO and risk-adjusted compensation. The association of Female CEO with the market value 
of compensation is less significant. Taken together, the latter two results confirm prior studies 
suggesting that female CEOs are less optimistic (Huang and Kisgen, 2013) and that less 
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optimistic CEOs receive higher fixed compensation because they are less likely to overestimate 
the value of compensation claims that are contingent on successful future outcomes (Otto, 
2014). 
In Panel B of Table 3, we examine if the relation between dividend payout and new 
CEO compensation is nonlinear. To do this, we classify firm-years using Dividend payout 
(Dividend/TA) into quartiles. In columns (1) and (3) (columns (2) and (4)), we replace the 
continuous Dividend payout (Dividend/TA) variable with three dummies for the 4th (top), 3rd, 
and 2nd quartiles of the dividend measure, with the 1st (bottom) quartile being the base group. 
Only the coefficient on the top-quartile dummy is consistently positive and significant across 
all four specifications. The coefficient on the third quartile is positive and significant in the 
first two specification. In contrast, the coefficient on the 2nd-quartile dummy is never 
significant. In terms of economic significance, the estimates in, e.g., column (2) imply that the 
initial compensation of new CEOs at firms in the top quartile of Dividend/TA is 28.8% higher 
than those in the bottom quartile. Overall, the results suggest that new CEO compensation 
increases with dividends, but primarily so at high levels of dividend payout. 
We perform a further analysis for stock repurchases in Panel C of Table 3.16 As 
expected, we do not find a significant relation between repurchases and new CEO 
compensation, regardless of how we define the repurchase variable. While both dividends and 
repurchases are methods of distributing cash to shareholders, repurchases do not constitute a 
commitment to make future payouts and hence provide managers with greater flexibility than 
dividends in terms of the amount and timing of distributions (Guay and Harford, 2000; 
Jagannathan et al., 2000; Brav et al., 2005). Thus, the finding that the positive and significant 
                                                          
16 We measure the dollar volume of repurchases using Compustat data item Purchases of Common and Preferred 
Stock. This item, however, likely overstates stock repurchases because it includes not only repurchases of stock 
but also other components such as conversions of preferred stock into ommon stock and retirement of preferred 
stock. We therefore reduce Purchases of Common and Preferred Stock for year t by any decrease in preferred 
stock that occurs between t-1 and t, following Dittmar (2000). 
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effect observed for dividends is not observed for repurchases provides further support for the 
compensation for dividend pressure view. In addition, in Appendix B, we exclude firm-years 
with repurchases to eliminate any impact of stock repurchases. Our results are robust to this 
exclusion.17 
 
3.2. Alternative dividend measures 
Prior literature suggests that industry peers play an important role in determining a 
firm’s dividend policy (Lintner 1956; Popadak, 2014). Thus, we use industry-adjusted dividend 
measures to capture the magnitude of the firm’s dividends relative to its industry peers. The 
industry-adjusted dividend payout (dividend-to-assets) ratio is defined as the difference 
between the actual value of Dividend payout (Dividend/TA) and the mean value18 of all firms 
in the same Fama-French 49 industry.19 As alternative approaches, we employ two other 
measures of the dividend variables. Residual dividend payout (Residual dividend/TA) is the 
residual from a firm fixed effects regression of Dividend payout (Dividend/TA) on all control 
variables used in Table 3 and year fixed effects. CDF dividend payout (CDF dividend/TA) is 
the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Dividend payout (Dividend/TA).20  
Table 4 presents the estimation results. For the sake of brevity, we report only the 
coefficient estimates for the main variables of interest. The results show that both market values 
and risk-adjusted values of new CEO compensation are positively related to alternative 
measures of dividends. All coefficients on the dividend variables are positive and statistically 
                                                          
17 The significance of the dividend coefficient is higher in two of the four specifications and the magnitude of the 
dividend coefficient is greater in all four specifications compared to Table 3. 
18 The results are not materially affected when we use industry-adjusted dividen measures based on the median 
value of all firms in the same Fama-French 49 industry. 
19 In alternative specifications (see Appendix C), we regress industry-adjusted compensation variables on 
industry-adjusted dividend measures along with other controls. The results continue to hold. 
20 By using the CDF variable, we estimate the effect of dividends on compensation for firms at different percentiles 
of the distribution of the dividend payout. For example, a firm whose dividend payout equates the median dividend 
payout has a CDF value of 0.5. The CDF values of zero and one correspond to the minimum and maximum 
dividend payouts in the sample. Following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), the CDF variable is computed on an 
annual basis. 
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significant, suggesting that firms with higher dividend payouts pay their new CEOs relatively 
more. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
3.3. Propensity score matching 
While the results so far are consistent with the hypothesis, we are mindful that the 
observed relation between the dividend payout and new CEO compensation could be spurious 
as the dividend policy may be endogenously determined. To mitigate this concern, we employ 
propensity score matching whereby firm-years with dividends are matched with those without. 
In the discussion and robustness section, we provide further evidence that reduces concerns 
about potential omitted variables as well as alternative interpretations. 
A perfect experiment for examining the impact of dividends on compensation would 
be one that compares new CEO compensation of firms that pay dividends in a particular year 
with that of the same firm in the same year, had it not paid any dividends. However, since this 
counterfactual cannot be observed, we have to rely on second-best experiments based on 
matching, whereby we compare new CEO compensation of a dividend-paying firm with that 
of another, sufficiently similar non-dividend-paying firm. 
We proceed in two steps to identify a matched sample of firm-years without dividends 
that exhibit no significant differences in observable characteristics with those with dividends.21 
In the first step, we estimate the probability that a firm pays dividends by running a logit 
regression, reported in column (1) of Panel A of Table 5,22 that includes the same controls a  
the regressions in Table 3. The results show that on average dividend-paying firms are larger 
                                                          
21 As a robustness check, we define the treatment group as firms wth above-sample-median dividend payouts and 
the control group as otherwise indistinguishable firms with below-sample- edian dividend payouts. Consistent 
with our prediction, the untabulated results suggest that high-dividend firms pay their new CEOs significantly 
more. 
22 The results are quali tatively similar when we use a probit model in the first step. 
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and more profitable in terms of ROA, have lower leverage, less cash holdings, more 
independent boards, and greater institutional ownership, and are more likely to appoint fast 
track career CEOs and CEOs from inside the firm. Additionally, the pseudo R2 of 35.5% 
indicates that the specification explains a significant amount of variation in the presence of 
dividends. In the second step, we construct matched samples using the nearest-neighbor 
method based on propensity scores calculated from the first-step logit model. Specifically, each 
firm-year with dividends (the treatment group) is matched with the firm-year without dividends 
(the control group) with the closest propensity score.23 To ensure that observations in the 
treatment and control groups are sufficiently indistinguishable, we require that the maximum 
difference (i.e. the caliper) in the propensity score between each firm-year with dividends and 
that of its matched peer does not exceed 0.001 in absolute value.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
We conduct two diagnostic tests to confirm that the observations in the treatment and 
control groups are truly comparable. We re-estimate the first-step logit model using the 
matched sample in column (2) of Panel A of Table 5. The results show that none of the 
coefficient estimates is statistically significant, suggesting no distinguishable differences 
between the two groups. Relatedly, the pseudo R2 drops considerably from 35.5% in the pre-
match model to only 1.9% in the post-match model. The second test involves examining the 
differences in means between the treatment and control groups across the various observable 
characteristics. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 5. Again, none of the differences is 
statistically significant. Overall, the test results suggest that the propensity score matching 
removes observable differences other than the difference in dividend policy, thereby increasing 
                                                          
23 As an alternative, we restrict the control group to firms that have not yet initiated dividends given the year. This 
restriction reduces the number of observations in the control group from 278 to 147, and that in the matched 
sample from 901 to 431. The resulting estimates remain positive, but with less significance. 
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the likelihood that any difference in new CEO compensation between the two groups is due to 
differences in dividend policy.  
Finally, Panel C of Table 5 reports the propensity score matching estimates.24 The 
results suggest that new CEOs at firms with dividends receive 20.0% (26.4%) higher 
compensation based on market values (risk-adjusted values), which corresponds to an increase 
of approximately $849,357 ($839,211). Thus, we conclude that potential matching between 
CEOs and firms—at least based on observable characteristics—does not drive our findings. 
While the matching estimates increase confidence in the validity of the results, one 
might be concerned that dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms are not comparable. 
To address this possibility, we implement an alternative matching approach that focuses on 
dividend-paying firms. We compare new CEO compensation of high-dividend-paying firms 
with that of matched, low-dividend-paying firms. The matching procedure is the same as 
previously described, except that the treatment, high-dividend-paying group now consists of 
firms in the top quartile of dividends, as measured by either Dividend payout or Dividend/TA. 
Using both dividend measures, we confirm that firms with high dividends pay their new CEOs 
more than their matched counterparts with low dividends. 
 
3.4. Dividend pressure and the effect of the dividend payout on new CEO compensation 
To investigate whether the positive effect of dividends on CEO pay is due to 
compensation for the performance pressure that a continuing high dividend payout entails, we 
explore the variation in the level of such pressure faced by the CEO. If pressure to maintain 
high levels of dividends increases the demands on the CEO and thus increases the pay that is 
required, we expect this positive link to be more pronounced when dividend pressure is greater. 
                                                          
24 The propensity score matching estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is the difference in 
means between the treatment and matched control groups. 
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We identify settings in which firms have stronger incentives to maintain, or even increase, the 
payout, thereby exerting greater pressure on the CEO. Specifically, we divide the sample into 
three subsamples along the following dimensions in order to capture the cross-sectional 
differences in the dividend-related pressure: the firm’s dividend history, institutional 
ownership, and internal governance. 
 
3.4.1. Dividend history 
Firms commit to stable dividend payouts to convey to investors their implicit 
commitment not to cut dividends opportunistically. La Porta et al. (2000), Shleifer (2000), 
Gomes (2000), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) discuss the importance of establishing a 
reputation for long-term, stable dividend payouts. The benefit from such a reputation stems 
from an enhanced ability to sell future equity and at higher prices. Thus, ceteris paribus, firms 
with a good dividend history have stronger incentives to protect their reputation by maintaining 
dividend payouts. If the positive effect of dividends on CEO pay is due to compensation for 
the dividend-related performance pressure, then we expect to observe a larger such effect for 
firms with a good dividend history where the pressure of maintaining the level of dividend 
payment is higher.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
In Table 6, we separately estimate the effect of dividends on new CEO compensation 
for firms with a good dividend history and those with a poor dividend history. We classify 
dividend history as “bad” if dividends (i.e. dividends per share) were cut at least once over the 
past two, three, and four years, respectively. If dividends were maintained or increased (no 
dividend cuts), then dividend history is classified as “good”. As expected, the coefficients on 
the dividend variables are positive and statistically significant for firms with no dividend cuts 
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over the past two, three and four years, but insignificant for firms with at least one cut during 
the same periods.  
 
3.4.2. Institutional ownership 
Institutional investors play a vital role in monitoring the management of their investee 
firms and determining firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). A strand of the literature 
demonstrates that the presence of institutional investors is associated with improved sensitivity 
of top executive turnover to firm performance (Denis et al., 1997), lower levels of 
compensation (Hartzell and Starks, 2003), improved corporate monitoring and better firm 
performance (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). As a result of better monitoring, institutional 
investors may pressure firms to pay more dividends to mitigate agency problems. Crane et al. 
(2016) show that higher institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends. Their 
identification relies on the exogenous variation in institutional ownership driven by the sharp 
difference in index weights around the Russell 1000/2000 cut-off.25 We thus expect the impact 
of dividends on new CEO compensation to be concentrated in the subsample of firms with high 
institutional ownership where institutional monitoring, through the threat of selling (exit) or 
active management (voice), such as voting and direct communication, increases dividend 
pressure. In contrast, in firms with low institutional ownership such pressure is significantly 
lower. 
                                                          
25 The Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 are value-weighted indexes of the largest 1000 US-listed firms and the 
subsequent largest 2000 firms, respectively. Firms around the 1000/20 cut-off exhibit remarkable differences 
in their relative index weights that are not driven by their firm characteristics. This is because the Russell 2000 is 
the principal Russell index benchmarked by fund managers (i.e. more fund managers benchmark to the Russell 
2000 index than the Russell 1000). This means that the largest firms in the Russell 2000 are likely to be held by 
any institutional investor tracking the index in order to keep tracking error metrics within reasonable limits. In 
contrast, the smallest firms in the Russell 1000 could be excluded given that they have little impact on the overall 
index value. As a result, institutional investors hold a larger proportion of firms that just about did not make it 
into the Russell 1000 compared to those that just made it into the Russell 1000. See Crane et al. (2016) for more 
details.  
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Insert Table 7 about here 
Panel A of Table 7 presents the compensation regressions for the subsamples of firms 
with high and low institutional ownership. A firm is included in the high institutional ownership 
subsample if its institutional ownership is above the sample median, and is included in the low 
institutional ownership subsample otherwise. The positive relation between the dividend 
payout and new CEO compensation is statistically significant only for the above-median 
institutional ownership firms. These results are consistent with the view that institutional 
investors pressure firms to maintain, or even increase, dividend payouts, thereby increasing the 
compensation the CEO requires.  
 
3.4.3. Internal governance 
La Porta et al. (2000) show that dividends are an outcome of an effective system that 
disgorges cash from firms to shareholders, thereby mitigating Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow 
problem. Similarly, DeAngelo et al. (2009) indicate that managers are encouraged to make and 
continue dividend payments through monitoring by the board. The board must be in a position 
to pressure the CEO to maintain and increase dividend payouts for dividend policy to be taken 
into account when setting the CEO’s compensation. In other words, we hypothesize that paying 
the CEO more due to dividend-related performance pressure requires strong internal 
governance. Thus, we expect the positive effect of dividends on compensation to be more 
pronounced for firms with strong boards.  
We use two measures of board strength: The fraction of independent directors on the 
board (Board independence) and the fraction of busy directors (Board busyness), with busy 
directors being defined as those who hold three or more directorships. In Panels B and C of 
Table 7, we split firms into high and low subsamples based on the sample median of a given 
governance variable. The results suggest that the positive effect of dividends on compensation 
 
25 
 
is concentrated in firms with more independent boards and those with boards composed of 
fewer busy directors, consistent with the view that strong boards exert greater pressure on the 
CEO to pay dividends and take this information into account when setting the new CEO’s pay. 
 
4. Discussion and robustness 
The results presented so far support the compensation for dividend pressure hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, several limitations remain, including potential omitted variables as well as 
various forms of model misspecification. While it is almost impossible to rule out completely 
the endogeneity of dividend policy, we can still explore whether the data is consistent with 
particular concerns. Therefore, in this section we first provide evidence that substantially 
restricts the set of alternative explanations for our results and then examine whether the results 
are robust to alternative choices in variable construction and sample selection. 
 
4.1. Alternative explanations and additional investigation 
A challenge encountered when drawing inferences in the CEO turnover setting is that 
the timing of CEO turnover may be endogenously determined by the manager and the board 
and may coincide with firm performance or other cycles within firms. Following Nguyen and 
Nielsen (2014) and Jenter et al. (2016), we identify a subsample of CEO turnover events 
following sudden deaths that are plausibly exogenous and beyond the control of the board. We 
define sudden death as an unexpected, non-traumatic death that occurs abruptly, such as strokes, 
heart attacks, and accidents. We identify cases of CEO deaths and sudden deaths through an 
extensive search of news and information sources in Lexis-Nexis and Edgar Online.  
Of the 331 deceased CEOs in our sample, 106 (32.0%) of the deaths were sudden. 
Specifically, 54 (50.7%) of the CEOs who suddenly died suffered from heart attack/failure and 
7 (6.4%) died from a stroke. Car accidents, plane crashes, and murders account for 22.3% of 
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the sudden deaths (24 cases). Finally, 22 deaths (20.6%) are described in the news as sudden 
and unanticipated without specific details about the cause of death.  
In Panel A of Table 8, we re-estimate the effect of dividends on new CEO compensation 
using a subsample of CEO turnover events (or new CEOs) following sudden deaths. While 
estimated using much fewer observations, the estimates from this sample restriction approach 
are arguably less affected by endogeneity problems. We use simple ordinary least square 
(OLS) regressions for this analysis due to the small sample size. The coefficient on the dividend 
variables remains positive and generally significant. Thus, endogenous timing of CEO turnover 
events is unlikely to account for our results. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
To take a further step toward mitigating the concerns, we explore the state-by-state 
transition from Prudent Man to Prudent Investor legislation. Under the Prudent Man rules, 
dividend payments serve as  safe harbor for fiduciary prudence. In contrast, the Prudent 
Investor rules do not explicitly favor dividends. Thus, switching from the Prudent Man rules 
to the less stringent Prudent Investor rules results in a decline in dividends (Hankins et al., 
2008), and in turn we expect a decrease in dividends to be associated with a decrease in new 
CEO compensation around the regulatory change.  
To test this conjecture, we first define treatment firms as those incorporated in 
switching states that have at least two CEO changes, one within the three-year window before 
the adoption of Prudent Investor legislation and the other one within the three years after 
adoption. For each treatment, we identify a control firm, incorporated in a no switching state 
(i.e. a state in which no switch in fiduciary law occurred), that has CEO changes in the same 
years and is closest in size, as measured by sales, to the treatment firm. We then compute and 
compare the changes in dividends and new CEO compensation between the treatment and 
control groups around the legislation. Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. Consistent with 
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our prediction, we observe a decrease in both dividends and new CEO compensation for 
treatment firms in switching states. Also consistent with our prediction, the increase in 
dividends and compensation for control firms in nonswitching states, and the differences in 
dividend change and compensation change between treatment and control firms are statistically 
significant. While the results are as expected, we have only a very small sample because most 
states switched from Prudent Man to Prudent Investor in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
predating our period of study, and hence our results should be interpreted with caution.  
Another possible concern is that our finding is just an artifact of the size or performance 
effect. Large, well-performing firms with higher dividends tend to pay their new CEOs more, 
resulting in the observed positive relation between dividends and compensation. Throughout 
the empirical analysis, we have included controls for firm performance and size, which helps 
alleviate this concern. To further rule out alternative explanations related to performance and 
size, we perform several tests. First, in the baseline specifications, we measure firm size as 
Ln(Sales) and use both accounting and stock performance measures (i.e. ROA and Stock return). 
In untabulated results, we confirm that the positive effect of dividends on new CEO 
compensation persists when (i) a different measure is used for firm size, namely Ln(MV) and 
Ln(TA); (ii) no controls are included for firm size; (iii) only one of the performance measures 
is included as a control; and (iv) no performance controls are included. In particular, the 
estimated effect is rather stable across all specifications. The coefficient on Dividend payout 
ranges from 0.075 to 0.084, and the coefficient on Dividend/TA ranges from 3.804 to 4.897. 
The stability of our coefficients provides additional confidence that any potential bias arising 
from bad proxies for performance and size is likely to be low (Oster, 2016). 
Next, if our compensation for dividend pressure hypothesis is valid, then the positive 
relation between dividends and compensation should be stronger in small, low performance 
firms where there might be greater difficulties in maintaining dividend payouts. The 
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performance/size effect view, however, does not yield such a prediction. If anything, the 
positive relation should be more prominent in large, high performance firms had the 
performance/size effect explanation dominated. We proceed by first extracting common 
components, using principal component analysis (PCA), from the three variables that proxy for 
firm performance and size, namely Ln(Sales), ROA, and Stock return. The resulting composite 
index is the first component from PCA, with higher (lower) values indicating large (small), 
high (low) performance firms.26 We then separately estimate the effect of dividends on new 
CEO compensation for firms with above- and below-median index values. We find some 
evidence in Panel C of Table 8 that the dividend-compensation relation is more prominent in 
small, low performance firms, consistent with the compensation for dividend pressure 
explanation. 
Finally, we also address the possibility that the dividend variables merely reflect private 
information about the firm’s prospects. We construct two residual dividend measures.  
Dividend payout_resid1 (Dividend/TA_resid1) is the residual from a regression of Dividend 
payout (Dividend/TA) on ROA and Stock return from year t+1. Dividend payout_resid2 
(Dividend/TA_resid2) is the residual from a regression of Dividend payout (Dividend/TA) on 
Ln(Sales) from year t+1. These measures represent the proportion of dividends that does not 
merely reflect future performance or size. The unreported results are robust to using the 
alternative measures, suggesting that private information about prospects does not appear to 
drive our results.  
                                                          
26 We obtain only one component with an eigenvalue higher than one (eigenvalu  of 1.673). An eigenvalue above 
one means that the extracted component has more explanatory power than any of the original proxies on their 
own. The eigenvalue of the second component is less than one. As expected, all the three original variables have 
positive loadings, implying a positive correlation with the composite index. The loadings are 0.660, 0.705, and 
0.261 respectively for Ln(Sales), ROA, and Stock return. 
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4.2. Further robustness tests 
We perform an extensive set of robustness checks of our main findings. First, we adopt 
a wide range of alternative parameter values for calculating risk-adjusted compensation. The 
two key parameters are the CEO’s degree of relative risk aversion, ρ, and the portfolio 
constraint, θ (i.e. the fraction of wealth that the CEO holds in his firm’s stock beyond the 
fraction he would voluntarily hold). We vary the parameter of relative risk aversion from one 
to five, and vary the value of the portfolio constraint parameter from 20% to 80%. The resulting 
risk-adjusted values, based on various combinations of the two varying parameters, are then 
used to re-estimate the effect of the dividend payout on compensation. The results are shown 
in Table 9. For the sake of brevity, for each regression we only report the coefficient on the 
dividend variable while the same set of control variables and year fixed effects as in Table 3 
are included. We find a positive and significant effect of the dividend payout on new CEO 
compensation across these parameter variations. Importantly, we observe that the magnitude 
of the reported coefficients decreases (increases) as we increase (decrease) CEO risk aversion 
and the portfolio constraint CEOs face. These patterns are consistent with those reported by 
Peters and Wagner (2014), which is reassuring. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
Second, we check whether the results are robust to three alternative measures of 
dividends: Dividend/Sales, which is the ratio of dividends to sales; DPS, which is the dividend 
per share; and Dividend yield, which is the dividend per share divided by the fiscal year-end 
share price. In Panel A of Table 10, we estimate our baseline models using these alternative 
measures and find qualitatively similar results.  
Third, a concern is that new CEOs assume office at different times throughout their 
firm’s fiscal years and hence the reported initial compensation may reflect the amount received 
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for periods of different lengths. Moreover, this timing issue is more severe for cash 
compensation paid to external hires. This is because salary and bonus are more likely to be pro 
rata than equity-based pay. For internally promoted CEOs, reported salary and bonus values 
reflect the amounts earned over the entire fiscal year, and not just the proportion earned during 
the time the executive served as CEO. As a result, the magnitude of timing differences is much 
smaller for internal CEOs than external CEOs. To address this concern, we follow Chang et al. 
(2016) and adjust the compensation variables by replacing the reported cash compensation with 
the annualized cash compensation. In Panel B of Table 10 we use the annualized salary for 
external CEOs instead of the reported salary, and in Panel C we use both the annualized salary 
and annualized bonus for external CEOs.27 In all of these regressions, the coefficients on the 
dividend variables remain positive and statistically significant, indicating that timing 
differences do not drive our findings. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
Fourth, Custódio et al. (2013) show that CEOs with general managerial skills are paid 
more than those with specific skills. Therefore, in Panel D we include the general ability index 
(GAI) constructed by Custódio et al. (2013) as an additional control.28 The results are largely 
unaffected by this inclusion. 
Fifth, Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson et al. (2004) find that the average post-
turnover increase in performance is greater following forced turnover compared to voluntary 
turnover. Thus, if firms with higher dividend payouts force out their CEOs more frequently, 
then it is likely that the documented positive association between the dividend payout and 
                                                          
27 The annualized salary is computed as (reported salary/days as CEO) × 365 and the annualized bonus is 
computed as (reported bonus/days as CEO) × 365. 
28 The general ability index (GAI) is the first factor obtained from applying principal component analysis to the 
following five proxies of general managerial ability: past number of positions, number of firms, number of 
industries, CEO experience, and conglomerate experience. We thank Cláudia Custódio, Miguel Ferreira, and 
Pedro Matos for sharing their data on the general ability index (Custódio et al., 2013). The data spans the period 
1996-2007.  
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compensation is driven by greater expected performance improvements following forced 
turnover. To address this possibility, we account for the nature of the prior turnover by 
including the Forced turnover indicator variable, which equals one if the incumbent CEO was 
forced out, and zero otherwise.29 The results, presented in Panel E of Table 10, show that the 
positive effect of dividends on compensation remains after we control for Forced turnover as 
well as its interaction term with the corresponding dividend variable, suggesting that our main 
findings cannot be explained by the nature of the prior turnover.  
Sixth, in Panel F we include Predecessor’s total pay (the predecessor’s last annual 
compensation) as well as its interaction term with External hire in the regressions to predict 
the new CEO’s initial compensation. Possibly reflecting that this inclusion takes into account 
additional aspects of the firm’s compensation policy not captured in our baseline specifications, 
the predecessor’s pay is highly correlated with the new CEO’s pay. In addition, we use the 
interaction term to account for the possibility that the predecessor’s compensation has a greater 
effect on the choice and compensation of an internally promoted CEO. Still, we find that the 
coefficients on the dividend variables remain positive and generally significant. Not 
surprisingly, the magnitudes of the coefficients are lower.  
Seventh, the results in Panel G suggest that the relation between dividend payout and 
new CEO compensation remains positive, albeit less significantly so, after controlling for New 
CEO’s last total pay (the new CEO’s last annual compensation in their previous firm) and its 
interaction with External hire to capture additional CEO-specific factors that may influence 
the initial compensation received from their new firm. In Panel H we show that our results are 
                                                          
29 We are grateful to Florian Peters and Alexander Wagner for providing us with their forced turnover dataset. 
Their dataset records forced CEO turnover events of all firms included in the ExecuComp database between 1993 
and 2014. The methodology is as follows. Departures for which the press states that the CEO was fired, forced 
out, or retired or resigned due to policy differences or pressure are classified as forced. Turnover of CEOs below 
the age of 60 that has not been classified as forced by the above criterion is classified as forced if the press does 
not report the reason to be death, poor health, or acceptance of another position or the press reports that the CEO 
is retiring but the company does not announce the retirement date at least six months before departure. For more 
details, see Peters and Wagner (2014). 
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also robust to excluding financial firms. Eighth, to mitigate the possibility that our findings are 
driven by unobserved heterogeneity between dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms, 
we exclude firm-years without dividends in Panel I and find that the results continue to hold.  
Finally, another possible concern is that firms with high dividend payouts attract more 
talented CEOs who demand higher compensation. The baseline models already account for 
several CEO characteristics that may reflect the CEO’s talent or ability such as MBA, Ivy league, 
and Fast track. Nevertheless, we include additional controls to further ensure that our results 
are not driven by differences in managerial quality. In Panel J we add further controls for CEO 
quality, including the managerial ability score of Demerjian et al. (2012),30 the average ROA 
and the average stock return over the past three years of the new CEO’s previous firm. The 
latter two measures are proxies for the new CEO’s performance in their previous firm. In Panel 
K we account for differences in education and qualifications between the predecessor and new 
CEO by replacing MBA and Ivy League in the baseline model with a set of indicator variables. 
MBA replaces non-MBA (Non-MBA replaces MBA) is an indicator variable stating whether the 
departing CEO without (with) an MBA degree is replaced by a new CEO with (without) an 
MBA degree; Non-Ivy replaces Ivy (Ivy replaces non-Ivy) is an indicator variable stating 
whether the departing CEO who attended (did not attend) an Ivy-League university is replaced 
by a new CEO who did not (did). Overall, we find that our estimated effect is not much affected 
when we include the above additional controls. Of course, we cannot control for unobservable 
CEO quality differences. However, the stability of the coefficients after the inclusion of several 
additional observable CEO quality controls suggests that unobservable selection due to CEO 
quality is likely to be limited (Oster, 2016). In a supplementary analysis, we regress measures 
of CEO quality including the managerial ability score of Demerjian et al. (2012), MBA Ivy 
                                                          
30 The data is downloadable at: http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html. 
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league, and Fast track on dividends along with other controls. We do not find reliable evidence 
that dividends are correlated with CEO quality. 
  
5. Conclusion 
We examine the effect of the dividend payout on the initial compensation of new CEOs. 
We focus our analysis on newly appointed CEOs because this allows us to isolate the effect of 
dividends on compensation and, more importantly, this allows us to provide new insights into 
an aspect of compensation that has been largely neglected in the literature. We find that new 
CEOs at firms with higher dividend payouts earn significantly more. The results are robust to 
alternative measures of dividend payouts, subsample analysis, and alternative model 
specifications. Next, we exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the effect of dividends on 
compensation. The results suggest that the positive effect of the dividend payout is more 
pronounced when firms have a good dividend history, when institutional ownership is higher, 
and when boards are strong. These findings provide evidence that new CEOs receive higher 
pay as compensation for greater dividend pressure. 
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Table 1 
 Summary statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables. Total compensation is the market value of total compensation (ExecuComp item tdc1). Risk-adjusted compensation 
is the risk-adjusted value of total compensation computed using the Ingersoll (2006) model. Dividend payout is dividends over net income. Dividend/TA is dividends over total 
assets. Sales is the firm’s sales. Tobin’s Q is the sum of the book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of 
total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Stock return is the annual stock return. Cash is cash 
and short-term investments divided by total assets. Firm age is the number of years since the firm has had its shares listed. Board busyness is the fraction of busy directors. 
Board independence is the fraction of independent directors. Fraction female directors is the fraction of female directors. Institutional ownership is the proportion of equity 
owned by 13-F institutional investors. CEO age is the age of the CEO in years. Female CEO is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO is a woman, and zero 
otherwise. External hire is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO was hired from outside the firm, and zero otherwise. MBA is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the CEO has an MBA degree, and zero otherwise. Ivy League is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO attended an Ivy League school at any 
academic level, and zero otherwise. Fast track is the age at which the CEO became a CEO for the first time. Military CEO is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
CEO has any military experience, and zero otherwise. Recession CEO is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if there was a recession during the year when the CEO 
reached the age of 24, and zero otherwise. 
Variable N mean Median Standard deviation 5th percentile 95th percentile 
Panel A. CEO compensation 
Total compensation ($ thousands) 2135 4246.785 2717.141 5240.526 535.808 12909.840 
Risk-adjusted compensation ($ thousands) 2047 3178.830 2004.248 3905.348 453.427 9697.906        
 
Panel B. Firm characteristics 
Dividend payout 2135 0.268 0.112 0.597 0.000 0.990 
Dividend/TA 2135 0.014 0.005 0.024 0.000 0.049 
Sales ($ millions) 2135 6069.303 1504.352 16,875.370 163.428 26,741.960 
Tobin’s Q 2135 1.864 1.478 1.275 0.944 3.918 
Leverage 2135 0.222 0.210 0.175 0.000 0.536 
ROA 2135 0.088 0.083 0.099 -0.030 0.232 
Stock return 2135 0.154 0.110 0.485 -0.488 0.922 
Cash 2135 0.135 0.073 0.154 0.005 0.456 
Firm age 2135 27.490 22.000 19.969 5.000 73.000        
 
Panel C. Corporate governance 
Board busyness 2135 0.307 0.250 0.282 0.000 1.000 
Board independence 2135 0.725 0.750 0.173 0.417 0.917 
Fraction female directors 2135 0.111 0.111 0.107 0.000 0.300 
Institutional ownership 2135 0.706 0.724 0.182 0.373 0.993        
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Panel D. CEO characteristics 
CEO age 2135 53.074 53.000 6.624 42.000 64.000 
Female CEO 2135 0.036 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.000 
External hire  2135 0.275 0.000 0.447 0.000 1.000 
MBA 2135 0.366 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
Ivy league  2135 0.154 0.000 0.361 0.000 1.000 
Fast track 2135 49.270 50.000 7.000 38.000 60.000 
Military CEO 2135 0.053 0.000 0.225 0.000 1.000 
Recession CEO 2135 0.224 0.000 0.417 0.000 1.000 
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Table 2 
Univariate analysis 
 
This table reports the means and standard deviations of the main variables for th  subsamples of firms with and without dividends. For each variable, the differences in means 
between the two subsamples are reported along with the t-statistics based on the two-sample t-t st. Appendix A contains the detailed definition of all the variables.  
 Firm-year obs. 
With no dividend 
 Firm-year obs. 
With dividend 
   
 N Mean Std. dev.  N Mean Std. dev.  Difference t-stat 
Total compensation ($ thousands) 822 3596.865 4901.141  1313 4653.666 5404.402  1056.801*** 4.555 
Risk-adjusted compensation ($ thousands) 783 2409.305 3650.228  1264 3655.521 3982.810  1246.216*** 7.101 
Sales ($ millions) 822 2454.486 5974.504  1313 8332.349 20,677.290  5877.863*** 7.945 
Tobin’s Q 822 2.023 1.518  1313 1.765 1.085  -0.257*** -4.559 
Leverage 822 0.196 0.198  1313 0.238 0.158  0.042*** 5.375 
ROA 822 0.072 0.127  1313 0.098 0.075  0.026*** 5.913 
Stock return 822 0.190 0.638  1313 0.131 0.355  -0.060*** -2.771 
Cash 822 0.202 0.189  1313 0.093 0.108  -0.109*** -16.908 
Firm age  822 18.356 13.864  1313 33.208 21.056  14.851*** 17.934 
Board busyness 822 0.268 0.262  1313 0.332 0.292  0.064*** 5.153 
Board independence 822 0.703 0.187  1313 0.738 0.162  0.035*** 4.605 
Fraction female directors 822 0.090 0.108  1313 0.124 0.105  0.034*** 7.247 
Institutional ownership 822 0.730 0.179  1313 0.749 0.182  0.019* 1.843 
CEO age 822 52.203 7.202  1313 53.620 6.175  1.417*** 4.834 
Female CEO 822 0.036 0.188  1313 0.036 0.186  -0.001 -0.084 
External hire  822 0.371 0.483  1313 0.215 0.411  -0.156*** -7.982 
MBA 822 0.344 0.475  1313 0.380 0.486  0.036* 1.669 
Ivy league  822 0.156 0.363  1313 0.152 0.359  -0.003 -0.212 
Fast track 822 47.658 7.403  1313 50.280 6.539  2.621*** 8.562 
Military CEO 822 0.043 0.202  1313 0.060 0.238  0.018* 1.759 
Recession CEO 822 0.236 0.425  1313 0.217 0.412  -0.019 -1.021 
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Table 3 
Payout policy and new CEO compensation 
 
This table examines how new CEO compensation is affected by the firm’s payout policy. The dependent variables 
include: Ln(Total compensation) is the natural logarithm of total compensation (ExecuComp item tdc1). Ln(Risk-
adjusted compensation) is the natural logarithm of risk-adjusted compensation computed using the Ingersoll (2006) 
model. The main independent variables of interest include: Dividend payout is dividends over net income. 
Dividend/TA is dividends over total assets. In Panel B, we replace the continuous dividen  variable with three 
indicator variables for firms within the 4th (top), 3rd, and 2nd quartiles of the dividend measure. The 1st (bottom) 
quartile is the base group. Measures of stock repurchases in Panel C include: Repurchase/NI is repurchases over 
net income. Repurchase/TA is repurchases over total assets. Repurchase dummy is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm repurchases stock, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Year effects 
are included. Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Dividend payout and new CEO compensation 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dividend payout 0.081**  0.078**  
 (0.038)  (0.036)  
Dividend/TA  4.736**  4.474** 
  (2.242)  (2.196) 
Ln(Sales) 0.527*** 0.530*** 0.585*** 0.586*** 
 (0.178) (0.176) (0.193) (0.191) 
Tobin’s Q 0.094 0.086 0.058 0.049 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056) 
Leverage -0.458 -0.525 -0.387 -0.452 
 (0.328) (0.330) (0.330) (0.332) 
ROA -2.142 -2.283 -1.998 -2.126 
 (2.172) (2.175) (2.366) (2.374) 
Stock return 0.032 0.035 0.116 0.119 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
Cash 0.437 0.545 0.559 0.668 
 (0.551) (0.575) (0.549) (0.578) 
Firm age -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Board busyness 0.077 0.111 -0.068 -0.038 
 (0.178) (0.174) (0.161) (0.160) 
Board independence -0.144 -0.168 0.041 0.022 
 (0.363) (0.359) (0.360) (0.355) 
Fraction female directors -0.348 -0.413 -0.104 -0.177 
 (0.384) (0.381) (0.341) (0.338) 
Institutional ownership 0.819 0.870 0.760 0.805 
 (0.708) (0.716) (0.698) (0.705) 
CEO age -0.014* -0.013* -0.013* -0.013* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Female CEO 0.208* 0.215* 0.210** 0.218** 
 (0.110) (0.114) (0.097) (0.100) 
External hire  0.227*** 0.227*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.058) (0.058) 
MBA 0.100 0.104 0.053 0.057 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.068) (0.069) 
Ivy league  -0.159 -0.155 -0.170* -0.168* 
 (0.100) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) 
Fast track 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Military CEO 0.040 0.019 0.074 0.057 
 (0.105) (0.102) (0.097) (0.095) 
Recession CEO 0.015 0.016 0.036 0.036 
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 (0.073) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071)      
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2135 2135 2047 2047 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.150 0.169 0.173 
 
Panel B: Nonlinearity in the relation between dividend payout and new CEO compensation 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2nd Qtile Dividend payout 0.013  -0.011  
 (0.269)  (0.268)  
3rd Qtile Dividend payout 0.376***   0.374***   
 (0.135)  (0.128)  
4th Qtile Dividend payout 0.315**   0.357**   
 (0.153)  (0.143)  
2nd Qtile Dividend/TA  -0.162  -0.122 
  (0.143)  (0.139) 
3rd Qtile Dividend/TA  0.071  0.097 
  (0.127)  (0.122) 
4th Qtile Dividend/TA  0.253*   0.292**  
  (0.146)  (0.140) 
All Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2135 2135 2047 2047 
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.147 0.186 0.172 
 
Panel C: Share repurchase and new CEO compensation  
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Repurchase/NI 0.077   0.080   
 (0.062)   (0.060)   
Repurchase/TA  0.640   0.797  
  (1.241)   (1.274)  
Repurchase dummy   0.058   0.066 
   (0.072)   (0.073) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2135 2135 2135 2047 2047 2047 
Adjusted R2 0.143 0.142 0.142 0.167 0.165 0.165 
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Table 4 
Using alternative dividend measures 
 
This table examines the effect of dividends on new CEO compensation using alternative dividend measures. The dependent variables include the following: Ln(Total compensation) 
is the natural logarithm of total compensation (ExecuComp item tdc1). Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) is the natural logarithm of risk-adjusted compensation computed using the 
Ingersoll (2006) model. The main independent variables of interest include the following: Industry-adj. dividend payout (Industry-adj. dividend/TA) is the difference between the 
firm’s Dividend payout (Dividend/TA) and the mean value for all firms in the same Fama-French 49 industry. Residual dividend payout (Residual dividend/TA) is the residual from a 
firm fixed effects regression of Dividend payout (Dividend/TA) on all control variables used in Table 3 and year dummies. CDF dividend payout (CDF dividend/TA) is the empirical 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Dividend payout (Dividend/TA). The same set of control variables and year fixed effects as in our baseline models are included. For brevity, 
we only report the coefficients on the dividend variables. Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Ln(Total compensation)  Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Industry-adj. dividend payout 0.081**       0.078**      
 (0.038)       (0.036)      
Industry-adj. dividend/TA  4.736**       4.474**     
  (2.242)       (2.196)     
Residual dividend payout   0.081**       0.078**    
   (0.038)       (0.037)    
Residual dividend/TA    4.708**       4.455**   
    (2.278)       (2.234)   
CDF dividend payout     0.261**       0.242**  
     (0.132)       (0.119)  
CDF dividend/TA      0.319**       0.312** 
      (0.139)       (0.134) 
All controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135  2047 2047 2047 2047 2047 2047 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.150 0.146 0.150 0.141 0.148  0.169 0.173 0.169 0.173 0.164 0.172 
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Table 5 
Propensity score matching estimates 
 
This table reports the propensity score matching estimation results. Panel A reports parameter estimates from the 
logit model used to estimate propensity scores. The dependent variable is an indicator vari ble equal to one for 
dividend-paying firms, and zero otherwise. All independent variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry effects 
are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Panel B reports the univariate 
comparisons of firm characteristics between firms with and without dividends. Panel C reports the average 
treatment effect estimates. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Prematch propensity score regression and postmatch diagnostic regression 
 
Dependent variable: 
Dummy equals one for dividend-paying firms and zero otherwise 
 Pre-match Post-match 
 (1) (2) 
Ln(Sales) 0.383*** 0.134 
 (0.065) (0.089) 
Tobin’s Q -0.098 0.137 
 (0.084) (0.117) 
Leverage -1.758*** -0.368 
 (0.467) (0.584) 
ROA 5.525*** 1.110 
 (1.292) (1.456) 
Stock return -0.292** -0.097 
 (0.132) (0.203) 
Cash -3.719*** -1.383 
 (0.642) (0.870) 
Firm age 0.036*** 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
Board busyness -0.155 -0.543 
 (0.362) (0.479) 
Board independence 0.719* 0.568 
 (0.391) (0.607) 
Fraction female directors 1.168* 0.264 
 (0.683) (0.959) 
Institutional ownership 1.348* 1.106 
 (0.784) (0.869) 
CEO age -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.016) 
Female CEO 0.110 -0.064 
 (0.344) (0.412) 
External hire  -0.300** 0.034 
 (0.142) (0.200) 
MBA 0.093 0.000 
 (0.131) (0.175) 
Ivy league  -0.143 -0.018 
 (0.178) (0.230) 
Fast track 0.027** -0.000 
 (0.011) (0.015) 
Military CEO 0.437 0.163 
 (0.284) (0.357) 
Recession CEO -0.219 -0.242 
 (0.152) (0.188)    
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2100 901 
Pseudo R2 0.355 0.019 
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Panel B. Differences in firm characteristics 
 
Firm-year obs. With 
dividends 
Firm-year obs. With no 
dividends   
Variables N= 623 N=278 Diff t-stat      
Ln(Sales) 21.337 21.207 0.130 1.275 
Tobin’s Q 1.799 1.769 0.030 0.393 
Leverage 0.234 0.219 0.015 1.191 
ROA 0.096 0.092 0.004 0.748 
Stock return 0.142 0.157 -0.015 -0.475 
Cash 0.117 0.133 -0.016 -1.455 
Firm age 28.087 25.860 2.227 1.471 
Board busyness 0.309 0.296 0.013 0.656 
Board independence 0.736 0.724 0.012 1.042 
Fraction female directors 0.117 0.104 0.013 1.529 
Institutional ownership 0.733 0.727 0.006 0.693 
CEO age 53.302 53.277 0.025 0.051 
Female CEO 0.037 0.040 -0.003 -0.193 
External hire  0.254 0.277 -0.023 -0.737 
MBA 0.376 0.356 0.019 0.559 
Ivy league  0.159 0.158 0.001 0.024 
Fast track 49.708 49.385 0.323 0.637 
Military CEO 0.056 0.054 0.002 0.135 
Recession CEO 0.236 0.270 -0.034 -1.088 
Panel C. Propensity score matching estimator 
 
Firm-year obs. 
With dividends 
Firm-year obs. 
With no 
dividends   
Variable N= 623 N=278 Difference T-stat 
Ln(Total compensation) 14.802 14.620 0.182*  1.710 
Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 14.616 14.382 0.234**  1.990 
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Table 6 
The effect of the dividend payout on new CEO compensation and dividend history 
 
In this table, we separately estimate the effect of dividends on new CEO compensation for firms with a good dividend history and those with a bad dividend history. We classify 
dividend history as “bad” if dividends are cut at least once over the past two, three, and four years. If dividends are maintained or increased (no dividend cut), then dividend history is 
classified as “good”. The dependent variables include: Ln(Total compensation) is the natural logarithm of total compensation (ExecuComp item tdc1). Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
is the natural logarithm of risk-adjusted compensation computed using the Ingersoll (2006) model. The main independent variables of interest include: Dividend payout is dividends 
over net income. Dividend/TA is dividends over total assets. The same set of control variables and year fixed effects as in our baseline models are included. For brevity, we only report
the coefficients on the dividend variables. Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Past two years 
 Good: no cuts  Bad: at least one cut 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)  Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dividend payout 0.123***   0.120***    0.062  -0.031  
 (0.034)  (0.031)   (0.095)  (0.088)  
Dividend/TA  3.018*   1.909   -6.839  -4.002 
  (1.697)  (1.507)   (9.700)  (8.638)     
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 988 988 975 975  1147 1147 1072 1072 
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.330 0.352 0.336  0.240 0.241 0.264 0.265           
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Panel B. Past three years 
 Good: no cuts  Bad: at least one cut 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)  Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dividend payout 0.134***   0.112***    0.031  -0.039  
 (0.043)  (0.040)   (0.098)  (0.089)  
Dividend/TA  3.849*   2.265   0.173  2.307 
  (2.247)  (2.093)   (8.887)  (8.000)           
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 871 871 862 862  1264 1264 1185 1185 
Adjusted R2 0.370 0.362 0.378 0.369  0.210 0.210 0.237 0.237 
Panel C. Past four years 
 Good: no cuts 
 Bad: at least one cut 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)  Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dividend payout 0.153***   0.125**    0.037  -0.010  
 (0.055)  (0.050)   (0.074)  (0.068)  
Dividend/TA  2.611*   0.983   7.898  7.407 
  (1.496)  (3.434)   (6.807)  (6.212)     
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 754 754 748 748  1381 1381 1299 1299 
Adjusted R2 0.409 0.393 0.399 0.386  0.197 0.200 0.223 0.226 
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Table 7 
The effect of the dividend payout on new CEO compensation and corporate governance 
 
This table presents the firm fixed effects regression results separately for the llowing subsamples: Firms with high and low levels of institutional ownership, firms with high and low 
levels of board busyness, and firms with high and low levels of board independence. Firms are split into high and low subsamples based on th  sample median for a given variable. 
For example, a firm is included in the high institutional ownership subsample if its institutional ownership is above the sample median, and is included in the low institutional ownership 
subsample otherwise. The dependent variables include the following: Ln(Total compensation) is the natural logarithm of total compensation (ExecuComp item tdc1). Ln(Risk-adjusted 
compensation) is the natural logarithm of risk-adjusted compensation computed using the Ingersoll (2006) model. The main independent variables of interest include the following: 
Dividend payout is dividends over net income. Dividend/TA is dividends over total assets. The same set of control variables and year fixed effects as in our baseline models are 
included. For brevity, we only report the coefficients on the dividend variables. Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Institutional ownership 
 High institutional ownership  Low institutional ownership 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)  Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dividend payout 0.121***   0.114***    0.093  0.054  
 (0.044)  (0.039)   (0.060)  (0.060)  
Dividend/TA  3.219***   2.197**    3.321  4.445 
  (1.158)  (1.036)   (5.280)  (5.516)     
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1068 1068 1026 1026  1067 1067 1021 1021 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.144 0.245 0.235  0.358 0.353 0.312 0.313 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Panel B. Board busyness           
 High board busyness  Low board busyness 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)  Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dividend payout 0.089  0.079   0.065  0.081*   
 (0.056)  (0.051)   (0.066)  (0.045)  
Dividend/TA  -0.910  -0.337   6.829**   6.637**  
  (1.540)  (1.417)   (3.113)  (2.979)     
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1120 1120 1067 1067  1015 1015 980 980 
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.183 0.221 0.209  0.283 0.298 0.349 0.363 
Panel C. Board independence           
 High board independence  Low board independence 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)  Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dividend payout 0.070*   0.095***    0.037  0.046  
 (0.039)  (0.034)   (0.075)  (0.074)  
Dividend/TA  2.529**   1.650*    2.669  2.013 
  (1.075)  (0.931)   (4.387)  (3.864)     
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1186 1186 1137 1137  949 949 910 910 
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.248 0.300 0.292  0.200 0.200 0.229 0.228 
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Table 8 
Alternative explanations and additional investigation 
 
This table provides additional evidence on the positive relation between dividends and new CEO compensation. 
The dependent variables include the following: Ln(Total compensation) is the natural logarithm of total 
compensation (ExecuComp item tdc1). Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) is the natural logarithm of risk-adjusted 
compensation computed using the Ingersoll (2006) model. The main indepe dent variables of interest include the 
following: Dividend payout is dividends over net income. Dividend/TA is dividends over total assets. Panel A 
estimates the effect of dividends on compensation using a subsample of CEO turnover events following sudden 
deaths, where sudden death is defined as an unexpected, non-traumatic death that occurs abruptly, such as strokes, 
heart attacks, and accidents. Industry effects are based on the Fama-French 12 i dustry classification. Panel B 
examines the effect of the switch from Prudent Man (PM) to Prudent Investor (PI) legislation. We compare 
changes in dividends and new CEO compensation for firms in switching states to changes in firms in states in 
which no switch in fiduciary law occurred. Panel C presents the firm fixed effects regression results separately 
for firms with high and low composite index values, where the composite index is the first factor of the principal 
component analysis of the three performance/size proxies including Ln(Sales), ROA, and Stock return. Statistical 
significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. New CEOs following sudden deaths 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dividend payout 0.139*   0.160**   
 (0.078)  (0.079)  
Dividend/TA  6.305  6.367*  
  (4.272)  (3.767) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 106 106 102 102 
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.282 0.290 0.321 
 
Panel B. Change in dividends and compensation: Prudent Investor legislation 
  
Treatment: 
Change from PM to PI 
Control: 
No PM change 
    
  N Mean N Mean Diff t-Stat 
∆Dividend payout  28 -0.047 28 0.152 -0.199*  1.947 
∆Dividend/TA 28 -0.007 28 0.014 -0.021***  2.791 
∆Ln(Total compensation) 28 -0.153 28 0.143 -0.296**  2.581 
∆Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 28 -0.136 28 0.262 -0.398**  2.733 
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Panel C. The effect of dividends on new CEO compensation by the composite index 
 High index: Large and high performance  Low index: Small and low performance 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)  Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dividend payout 0.121*   0.118*    0.164**   0.158***   
 (0.068)  (0.066)   (0.071)  (0.057)  
Dividend/TA  0.788  1.660   9.856**   9.567**  
  (2.751)  (2.544)   (4.458)  (4.239)           
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1067 1067 1015 1015  1068 1068 1032 1032 
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.215 0.256 0.245  0.292 0.307 0.314 0.330 
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Table 9 
The impact of CEO risk aversion and the portfolio constraint 
 
This table presents summary results from firm fixed effects regressions of risk-adjusted compensation on the 
dividend payout and control variables. The dependent variable, Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation), is the natural 
logarithm of risk-adjusted compensation computed using the Ingersoll (2006) model. The main independent 
variables of interest include the following: Dividend payout is dividends over net income. Dividend/TA is 
dividends over total assets. The table varies the CEO’s degree of relative risk aversion, ρ, and the portfolio 
constraint, θ, which is defined as the fraction of wealth that the manager holds in his firm’s stock beyond the 
fraction he would voluntarily hold. The same set of control variables and year fixed effects as in our baseline 
models are included. For brevity, we only report the coefficients on he dividend variables. Statistical significance 
is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
Calculated with varying risk aversion (ρ) and portfolio constraint (θ) 
 θ=20% 
(1) 
θ=40% 
(2) 
θ=60% 
(3) 
θ=80% 
(4) 
Panel A. Dividend payout   
ρ=1 0.083**  0.082**  0.082**  0.081**  
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
ρ=3 0.081**  0.079**  0.077**  0.077**  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
ρ=5 0.079**  0.076**  0.074**  0.074**  
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)     
Panel B. Dividend/TA    
ρ=1 4.532**  4.529**  4.522**  4.470**  
 (2.224) (2.213) (2.209) (2.209) 
ρ=3 4.516**  4.493**  4.456**  4.421**  
 (2.199) (2.194) (2.198) (2.207) 
ρ=5 4.497**  4.467**  4.425**  4.399**  
 (2.193) (2.198) (2.208) (2.220)     
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2047 2047 2047 2047 
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Table 10 
Robustness checks 
 
This table contains a number of checks testing the robustness of the relationship between the dividend payout and 
new CEO compensation to alternative model specifications, subsamples, dividen  measures, and variable 
definitions. For each robustness check, we estimate the firm fixed effects regressions separately for alternative 
measures of the dividend payout and for both market values and risk-adju ted values of compensation. The same 
set of control variables and year fixed effects as in our baseline regressions are included. For brevity, we only 
report the coefficients on the dividend variables, unless otherwise specified. Statistical significance is based on 
the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Ln(Total compensation)  
Ln(Risk-adjusted 
compensation)  
(1) 
 
(2) 
Panel A. Alternative measures of dividends 
Dividend/Sales 2.149*   2.243*  
 (1.218)  (1.170) 
DPS 0.149**   0.158**  
 (0.075)  (0.075) 
Dividend yield 2.850*   2.551*  
 (1.547)  (1.485) 
Number of observations 2135  2047     
 
Panel B. Using the annualized salary for external CEOs instead of the reported salary 
Dividend payout 0.081**   0.076**  
 (0.039)  (0.038) 
Dividend/TA 4.296*   3.758*  
 (2.412)  (2.208) 
Number of observations 2135  2047     
 
Panel C. Using both annualized salary and annualized bonus  
Dividend payout 0.089**   0.085**  
 (0.040)  (0.039) 
Dividend/TA 4.176*   3.607*  
 (2.471)  (2.080) 
Number of observations 2135  2047     
 
Panel D. Controlling for GAI (1996-2007)   
Dividend payout 0.065*   0.070*  
 (0.038)  (0.037) 
Dividend/TA 4.779**   4.393**  
 (2.058)  (1.893) 
Number of observations 1248  1194     
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Panel E. Controlling for the forced turnover indicator and its interaction term with the 
corresponding dividend variable 
Dividend payout 0.113***   0.107***  
 (0.042)  (0.040) 
Dividend payout × Forced turnover -0.112*   -0.104*  
 (0.057)  (0.057) 
Forced turnover -0.120  -0.118 
 (0.100)  (0.096) 
    
Dividend/TA 4.674*   4.570*  
 (2.411)  (2.395) 
Dividend/TA × Forced turnover 0.517  0.035 
 (2.360)  (2.355) 
Forced turnover -0.158  -0.147 
 (0.101)  (0.097) 
    
Number of observations 2135  2047     
 
Panel F. Controlling for predecessor’s total pay and its interaction term with the external hire 
indicator 
Dividend payout 0.062**   0.055*  
 (0.031)  (0.030) 
Predecessor’s total pay 0.201***   0.265***  
 (0.044)  (0.046) 
Predecessor’s total pay × External hire 0.127  0.105 
 (0.136)  (0.137) 
    
Dividend/TA 1.703*   0.949 
 (0.973)  (0.897) 
Predecessor’s total pay 0.198***   0.262***  
 (0.044)  (0.045) 
Predecessor’s total pay × External hire 0.129  0.108 
 (0.136)  (0.137) 
    
Number of observations 2096  1973 
    
Panel G. Controlling for the new CEO’s last total pay and its interaction term with the external 
hire indicator 
Dividend payout 0.053*   0.041*  
 (0.029)  (0.023) 
New CEO’s last total pay 0.401***   0.468***  
 (0.068)  (0.069) 
New CEO’s last total pay × External hire -0.056  -0.113**  
 (0.062)  (0.055) 
    
Dividend/TA 1.740  1.484*  
 (1.157)  (0.849) 
New CEO’s last total pay 0.402***   0.472***  
 (0.068)  (0.070) 
New CEO’s last total pay × External hire -0.055  -0.114**  
 (0.062)  (0.055) 
    
Number of observations 1299  1202 
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Panel H. Excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) 
Dividend payout 0.110***   0.104***  
 (0.040)  (0.039) 
Dividend/TA 4.785**   4.414**  
 (2.248)  (2.192) 
Number of observations 1862  1788 
    
Panel I. Excluding observations with no dividend payments 
Dividend payout 0.059*   0.058*  
 (0.033)  (0.033) 
Dividend/TA 3.559**   2.798*  
 (1.795)  (1.469) 
Number of observations 1313  1264 
    
Panel J. Controlling for the new CEO’s previous firm performance and Demerjian et al. (2012) 
managerial ability score 
Dividend payout 0.100***   0.099** *  
 (0.037)  (0.036) 
Dividend/TA 3.730**   3.103**  
 (1.492)  (1.373) 
Number of observations 1632  1616 
    
Panel K. Controlling for differences in qualification between the predecessor and new CEO 
Dividend payout 0.081**   0.077**  
 (0.037)  (0.036) 
Dividend/TA 4.523**   4.314**  
 (2.159)  (2.110) 
Number of observations 2135  2047 
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Appendix A 
Variable definitions 
 
 
 
Variable Name  Definition  Data Source 
Ln(Total compensation) Natural logarithm of total compensation (ExecuComp item dc1). Total compensation is 
converted into year 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index obtained from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 
ExecuComp, 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Ln(Risk-adjusted 
compensation) 
Natural logarithm of risk-adjusted compensation computed using the Ingersoll (2006) 
model. Risk-adjusted total compensation is calculated by replacing the market values of 
restricted stock grants and stock option grants given by ExecuComp with the risk-adjusted 
values. 
 ExecuComp, 
CRSP 
Dividend payout Dividends over net income.  Compustat 
Dividend/TA Dividends over total assets.  Compustat 
Ln(Sales)  Natural logarithm of sales (Compustat SALE). Sales is converted into year 2000 dollars 
using the Consumer Price Index obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 Compustat 
Tobin's Q Sum of book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity 
divided by book value of total assets [Compustat (AT + CSHO × PRCC_F - CEQ)/AT]. 
 Compustat 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets, where total debt is defined as current liabilities plus long-
term debt [Compustat (DLC + DLTT)/AT]. 
 Compustat 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets [Compustat EBIT/AT].  Compustat 
 
58 
 
 
Stock return Annual stock return [Compustat (PRCC_F(t)/AJEX(t) + DVPSX_F(t)/AJEX(t)) 
/(PRCC_F(t-1)/AJEX(t-1)) - 1]. 
 CRSP 
Cash Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets (Compustat CHE/AT).  Compustat 
Firm age Number of years since the firm has had its shares listed.   CRSP 
Industry volatility Industry stock return volatility computed from monthly equally-weighted returns of the 
Fama and French 49 industries. 
Ken French’s Data 
Library 
Industry rating Industry average of S&P long-term issuer credit rating.  Compustat 
Board busyness Ratio of the number of busy directors to board size, where busy directors are those who 
hold three or more directorships. 
 RiskMetrics 
Fraction female directors Ratio of the number of female directors to board size  RiskMetrics 
Board independence Ratio of the number of independent directors to board size.  RiskMetrics 
Institutional ownership Proportion of equity owned by 13-F institutional investors.  Thomson CDA 
Spectrum  
CEO age Age of the CEO in years.  ExecuComp 
Female CEO Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO is a woman, and zero otherwise.  ExecuComp 
External hire  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO was hired from outside the firm, and 
zero otherwise. 
 ExecuComp 
MBA Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO has a Master’s of Business 
Administration (MBA) degree, and zero otherwise. 
 BoardEx 
Ivy League  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO attended an Ivy League school (Brown 
University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard 
University, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University) at any 
academic level, and zero otherwise. 
 BoardEx 
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Fast track Age at which the CEO became a CEO for the first time.  BoardEx 
Military CEO Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO has any military experience, and zero 
otherwise. 
 BoardEx 
Recession CEO Dummy variable that takes a value of one if there was a recession during the year when the 
CEO reached the age of 24, and zero otherwise, following Schoar and Zuo (2016; 2017). 
 BoardEx 
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Appendix B 
Robustness check: Excluding observations with repurchases 
 
This table examines how new CEO compensation is affected by the firm’s dividends after excluding firm-years 
with repurchases. The dependent variables include: Ln(Total compensation) is the natural logarithm of total 
compensation (ExecuComp item tdc1). Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) is the natural logarithm of risk-adjusted 
compensation computed using the Ingersoll (2006) model. The main independent variables of interest include: 
Dividend payout is dividends over net income. Dividend/TA is dividends over total assets. All other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Year effects are included. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust 
firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * iicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dividend payout 0.187***   0.166***   
 (0.071)  (0.061)  
Dividend/TA  23.821**   23.439**  
  (10.767)  (10.666) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 961 961 920 920 
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.445 0.467 0.495 
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Appendix C 
Robustness check: Industry-adjusted compensation and dividend measures 
 
This table examines the effect of dividend payout on new CEO compensation using industry-adjusted 
compensation and dividend measures. The dependent variables include the following: Industry-adj. Ln(Total 
compensation) (Industry-adj. Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)) is the difference between the CEO’s Ln(Total 
compensation) (Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation)) and the mean value for all CEOs in the same Fama-French 49 
industry. The main independent variables of interest include the following: I dustry-adj. dividend payout 
(Industry-adj. dividend/TA) is the difference between the firm’s Dividend payout (Dividend/TA) and the mean 
value for all firms in the same Fama-French 49 industry. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Year 
effects are included. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Industry-adj. Ln(Total 
compensation) 
Industry-adj. Ln(Risk-adjusted 
compensation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Industry-adj. dividend 
payout 0.081**   0.078**   
 (0.038)  (0.036)  
Industry-adj. 
dividend/TA  4.736**   4.474**  
  (2.242)  (2.196) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 2135 2135 2047 2047 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.150 0.169 0.173 
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Table A1 
Propensity score matching estimates based on dividend-paying firms 
 
This table reports the results from propensity score matching estimation that compares new CEO compensation 
of high-dividend-paying firms with that of matched, low-dividend-paying firms. The high-dividend-paying group 
in Panel A consists of firms in the top quartile of Dividend payout. The high-dividend-paying group in Panel B 
consists of firms in the top quartile of Dividend/TA. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Panel A. high-dividend-paying group defined as firms in the top quartile of dividend payout 
 
Firm-year obs. 
with high 
dividends 
Firm-year obs. 
with low 
dividends   
Variable N= 303 N=198 Difference T-stat 
Ln(Total compensation) 14.836 14.643 0.193*  1.670 
Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 14.702 14.502 0.200*  1.820 
Panel B. high-dividend-paying group defined as firms in the top quartile of dividend/TA 
 
Firm-year obs. 
with high 
dividends 
Firm-year obs. 
with low 
dividends   
Variable N= 278 N=149 Difference T-stat 
Ln(Total compensation) 15.109 14.875 0.235*  1.870 
Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 14.938 14.688 0.250**  2.090 
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Table A2 
The effect of the dividend payout on new CEO compensation with industry-year effects 
 
This table examines the effect of the dividend payout on new CEO compensation accounting for industry-year 
effects. The dependent variables include: Ln(Total compensation) is the natural logarithm of total compensation 
(ExecuComp item tdc1). Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) is the natural logarithm of risk-adjusted compensation 
computed using the Ingersoll (2006) model. The main independent variables of interest include: Dividend payout 
is dividends over net income. Dividend/TA is dividends over total assets. The same set of control variables and 
year fixed effects as in our baseline models are included. For brevity, we only report the coefficients on the 
dividend variables. Industry-year effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. 
Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, r spectively. 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dividend payout 0.098**   0.093**   
 (0.041)  (0.039)  
Dividend/TA  6.001***   4.895***  
  (1.934)  (1.788) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2135 2135 2047 2047 
Adjusted R2 0.567 0.572 0.585 0.588 
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Table A3 
Managerial ability and dividend payout 
 
This table examines whether the qualifications/ability of a newly appointed CEO are correlated with the firm’s payout policy. Dependent variables are various measures of 
managerial ability. MBA is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the CEO has a Master’s of Business Administration (MBA) degree, and zero otherwise. Ivy league 
is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the CEO attended an Ivy League school at any academic level, and zero otherwise. Fast track is the age at which the CEO 
became a CEO for the first time. Ability score is the managerial ability score of Demerjian et al. (2012). For brevity, we only report the coefficients on the dividend variables. 
The same set of controls as in the baseline models are included, except the above managerial bility variables. Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust 
firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * i icate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 MBA Ivy league Fast track Ability score MBA Ivy league Fast track Ability score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dividend payout -0.010 0.007 0.127 0.007     
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.238) (0.005)     
Dividend/TA    -1.071 -0.270 13.511 0.023 
     (0.810) (1.096) (10.104) (0.222) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2135 2135 2135 1700 2135 2135 2135 1700 
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.030 0.391 0.158 0.061 0.030 0.392 0.156 
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Table A4 
Alternative performance and size controls 
 
This table examines the robustness of our results to specifications with alternative controls or no controls for firm 
performance and size. Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robus  firm-clustered standard 
errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Ln(Total compensation)  
Ln(Risk-adjusted 
compensation)  
(1) 
 
(2) 
Panel A. Replace Ln(sales) with Ln(MV) 
Dividend payout 0.079*   0.075*  
 (0.043)  (0.042) 
Dividend/TA 4.332*   4.214*  
 (2.389)  (2.356) 
Number of observations 2135  2047     
 
Panel B. Replace Ln(sales) with Ln(TA) 
Dividend payout 0.084**   0.081**  
 (0.040)  (0.038) 
Dividend/TA 4.897**   4.684**  
 (2.349)  (2.329) 
Number of observations 2135  2047     
 
Panel C. No controls for firm size  
Dividend payout 0.081**   0.081**  
 (0.039)  (0.038) 
Dividend/TA 4.647**   4.492*  
 (2.314)  (2.302) 
Number of observations 2135  2047     
 
Panel D. Include only ROA as a measure of firm performance   
Dividend payout 0.081**   0.078**  
 (0.038)  (0.037) 
Dividend/TA 4.718**   4.418**  
 (2.238)  (2.193) 
Number of observations 2135  2047 
 
Panel D. Include only Stock return as a measure of firm performance  
Dividend payout 0.077**   0.075**  
 (0.037)  (0.035) 
Dividend/TA 3.973**   3.829**  
 (1.947)  (1.875) 
Number of observations 2135  2047 
 
Panel D. No controls for firm performance 
Dividend payout 0.077**   0.075**  
 (0.037)  (0.035) 
Dividend/TA 3.970**   3.804**  
 (1.942)  (1.882) 
Number of observations 2135  2047 
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Table A5 
Alternative residual dividend measures 
 
This table examines the effect of the dividend payout on new CEO compensation using alternative, residual-based 
measures. The dependent variables include: Ln(Total compensation) is the natural logarithm of total compensation 
(ExecuComp item tdc1). Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) is the natural logarithm of risk-adjusted compensation 
computed using the Ingersoll (2006) model. The main independent variables of interest include: Dividend 
payout_resid1 (Dividend/TA_resid1) is the residual from a regression of Dividend payout (Dividend/TA) on ROA 
and Stock return from year t+1. Dividend payout_resid2 (Dividend/TA_resid2) is the residual from a regression 
of Dividend payout (Dividend/TA) on Ln(Sales) from year t+1. The same set of control variables and year fixed 
effects as in our baseline models are included. For brevity, we only report the coefficients on the dividend variables. 
Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, r spectively. 
Panel A. Residual dividend measures based on ROA and Stock return from year t+1 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dividend payout_resid1 0.069*   0.070*   
 (0.041)  (0.040)  
Dividend/TA_resid1  4.014**   3.549**  
  (1.827)  (1.784) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2052 2052 1968 1968 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.150 0.172 0.175 
 
Panel B. Residual dividend measures based on Ln(Sales) from year t+1 
 Ln(Total compensation) Ln(Risk-adjusted compensation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dividend payout_resid2 0.065*   0.072*   
 (0.037)  (0.040)  
Dividend/TA_resid2  4.794**   4.542**  
  (2.255)  (2.205) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2052 2052 1968 1968 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.153 0.173 0.178 
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Calculation of risk-adjusted compensation 
Risk-adjusted compensation is computed using the Ingersoll (2006) model. In this 
section, we describe the implementation of the model and summarize the key equations needed 
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for the computation. We replicate exactly the implementation described in Peters and Wagner 
(2014). A Stata program that implements the model is provided by Peters and Wagner (2015), 
which is available at: http://www.uva.nl/en/about-the-uva/organisation/staff-
members/content/p/e/f.s.peters/f.s.peters.html 
 
Calculating risk-adjusted values of restricted stock grants 
The risk-adjusted value of a share with continuously paid dividends restricted until time 
 is 
                           ̂ , = [ ̂ + − ̂ � − ̂ ]                                          (A1) 
where ̂  is the adjusted dividend yield derived by Ingersoll (2006). It equals ̂ = + � −� � . Other primitives in equation (A1) include: 
1.  is the share price at the grant date. 
2.  is the dividend yield. We use ExecuComp item _ �  for the period 1993-2005. For 
2006 onwards, this item no longer exists in ExecuComp. Thus, we use the dividend 
yield data from Compustat and compute  as an average dividend yield over the 
previous four years.  
3. � is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
4. � is the portfolio constraint, defined as the fraction of wealth that the manager holds in 
his firm’s stock beyond that he would voluntarily hold. 
5.  is the residual variance of the stock. It equals = � − � ��, where �  is the total 
stock variance,  � is the CAPM-� of the stock, and �� is the variance of the market 
return. Following Peters and Wagner (2014), we calculate the variances and estimate 
the CAPM-� using monthly stock and market returns on four-year rolling windows.  
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6.  is the vesting period for the restricted stock grant. Following Peters and Wagner 
(2014), we assume  = 3 years. 
The risk-adjusted value of an entire restricted stock grant is 
                             � [ ̂ + − ̂ � − ̂ ]                                                  (A2) 
where �  is the number of shares granted. We use ExecuComp item �� , the market 
value of the stock grant, for � .  
 
Calculating risk-adjusted values of stock option grants 
The risk-adjusted valuation of stock options with optimal exercise of the executive is 
discussed in Ingersoll (2006). A barrier derivative approach, originally developed by Ingersoll 
(1998), is employed in Ingersoll (2006) to price American options. The approximate value of 
a call option computed for a constant exercise policy is                                          ≈> max� , , �                                                  (A3) 
Where        = ̃ , ;  { > �} & { � � < �}  
                   −� ̃ , ;  { > �}&{ � � < �} + � − � ̃ , , �                     (A4) ̃ is a digital share and ̃ is a digital option. ̃ is a first-touch digital option. The formulas for 
these three digital contracts, as provided in Ingersoll (2006), are 
̃ , ;  { > �} & { � � < �} =                                                                          − ̂ {Φ ℎ�+ − Φ ℎ�+ − � �+ [Φ(ℎ� �⁄+ ) − Φ ℎ �⁄+ ]}            (A5) 
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                                                ̃ , ;  { > �} & { � � < �} =                                                                           − ̂ {Φ ℎ�− − Φ ℎ�− − � �[Φ(ℎ� �⁄− ) − Φ ℎ �⁄− ]}                     (A6) 
                                                ̃ , , � = � �−�Φ ��+ + � �+�Φ ��−                               (A7) 
where  
ℎ�± = ln �⁄ + ̂− ̂± ��√    
̂ = − ��   
� = [ ̂ − ̂ �⁄ ] −    
��± = ln �⁄ +���√   
and  
� = √� + ̂ �⁄   
In addition to the variables already defined and used in equation (A1), the following primitives 
are needed to compute the above terms: 
1. � is the strike price. We follow Peters and Wagner (2014) and assume that options are 
granted at the money. So the strike price is equal to the stock price on the grant date.  
2.  is the risk-free rate. We use ExecuComp item _�  for the period 1993-2005. 
For 2006 onwards, we use the one-year treasure rate.  
3.  is the option maturity. We follow Peters and Wagner (2014) and assume a stock option 
maturity of 10 years.  
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Finally, the risk-adjusted value of a stock option grant is calculated by multiplying the risk-
adjusted value of a given stock option with the number of options granted (ExecuComp item � _ _ ). 
 
 
 
